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Foreign Investment Contracts -
Host Country's Concerns
Peter Slinn
The topic of investment contracts embraces the whole range of
economic activity in the developing world. This paper will focus upon
mining development in a number of Commonwealth (mainly African)
countries. An attempt will be made to examine the factors affecting
contractual relations between investor and host, both in relation to
existing operations (some of which have a history going back deep into
the colonial past) and to new investment projects. In this context, it
is proposed to examine models of the legislative and institutional
framework provided by host countries. However, the legal analysis cannot
be divorced from an awareness of the general economic factors which
affect the respective bargaining strengths of host and investor.
Mining investment contracts have always presented particular problems
in view of the size of the investment required, the long lead time before
exploitation becomes profitable, the uncertain and unpredictable
relationship between costs and world commodity prices and the wasting
nature of the asset itself. The world economic climate of the
nineteen-eighties, however, is particularly harsh and threatens both the
viability of existing mining operations and the prospects for new
investment in exploration and development. No discussion of the legal
modalities can take place without awareness of the crisis now facing the
mining industry in developing countries. This crisis, a symptom of the
current world recession, involves factors outside the control of the
individual investor and host country. Only global collective action will
solve the underlying problems of the industry. With the best will in the
world, it is difficult to achieve an equitable bargain between host and
investor when the determinant price of the mineral produced is subject to
such violent fluctuations.
The problem now is how to operate mines at a profit at all, rather
than that of an equitable distribution of profits. Copper may be taken
as an example. The first annual report of the new Zambia Consolidated
Copper Mines, the 6C% state-owned concern which mines one of the world's
largest ore bodies, showed a loss of K173.6 million for the year 1981/2
despite increased production. No dividends were declared and the
government was obliged to waive taxes. President Kaunda's only
justification for keeping open unprofitable mines was the priority which
Zambia, as a socialist country, should give to the fate of miners and
their families.1 With the world copper price in real terms at its
lowest since the nineteen-fifties, even Bougainville, the Papua New
Guinea mine the development of which in the early 1970's had proved so
profitable as to compel, as we shall see, a renegotiation of the original
investment contract, moved into the red in 1982.,4
The implications for new investment are particularly grave. In a
forceful passage, the Brandt Report drew attention to the virtual drying
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up of exploration expenditure over large areas of the Third World and to
the breakdown of traditional patterns of exploration and investment. The
inevitable consequence of the current misallocation of mineral
exploration effort, concluded the Report, would be "selective mineral
shortages, price instability, severe inflationary influences and the
failure of many developing countries to develop potential
deposits.... "3  In a gloomy account of mine closures, the London
Economist speculated that even world economic recovery might not solve
the problems of some actual and potential producers and pointed to signs
that some metals are losing large chunks of their customary markets
through substitution, as in the case of optical fibres for copper wire in
the telecommunications industry.4 However, whatever the marginal
effects of substitution, there is awareness in the consumer countries of
the industrialised world that there may be a heavy future price to pay
for the short-term benefit of low commodity import prices.5 The
current crisis may provide some real impetus to the achievement of one of
the principal features of the thrust towards a New International Economic
Order, effective collective measures to introduce commodity price
stabilisation schemes which, in the mining sector, will benefit both host
producer countries and actual and potential investors from the capital
exporting countries.
Even in the context of the current world depression, some
commentators would deny that macro-economic factors relating to global
problems of supply and demand are the true explanation for any decline in
foreign investment in mining ventures in developing countries. Instead,
the problem is attributed to the "political risk factor" involved in
operations in such countries: their instability and unreliability is
alleged to provide an unfavourable climate for an investment which, in
the case of new mines, is unlikely to bear fruit for ten or more years.
Investors, it is argued, are faced with the imposition of an initially
onerous legal regime followed by the ever-present threat of repudiation
of agreements even by the governments which themselves negotiated
them.6 Hence, there is a preference for placing scarce new investment
resources in what is regarded as the more secure environment of such
countries as Australia and Canada.
The "investors' backlash" in effect seeks to reverse the trend of the
nineteen-seventies. In those years, host/investor negotiations tended to
produce modifications of earlier contracts, (or new contracts) which were
regarded as reflecting a modern principle of equity in that they yielded
an enhanced benefit element for the host country. A striking example of
this trend was the re-negotiation in 1974 of the Bougainville Copper
Agreement which itself only dated back to 1967. The 1967 Agreement was
negotiated between a territorial administration, then subject to
Australian control, and a locally incorporated subsidiary of Rio Tinto
Zinc. By the time of the achievement of local self-government at the end
of 1973 (preparatory to full independence in 1975), the terms of the deal
had begun to look less advantageous from the standpoint of the host
government. In particular, the tax concessions granted to Bougainville
Copper Ltd. (in which the local government had only a 20% stake) appeared
over generous in the light of high initial productivity during a period
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of buoyant world copper prices. The mine had commenced production in
1972, and net earnings were AS 158.4 million in 1973, the first full year
of operation. Under the terms of the 1967 Agreement, however, these
earnings were to be exempt from PNG taxation until 1976, and the
government's receipts from royalties, etc., were limited to AS 35
million. The prospect of high profits throughout the period of the tax
holiday created strong local pressure for renegotiation, particularly in
the light of the political threat to independence posed by a secessionist
movement among the Bougainville islanders, who were not anxious to share
"their" wealth with the distant mainland. The Company, having been
extremely reluctant to negotiate at all, resisted fiercely when talks did
take place. Eventually, after six months of hard bargaining, and a
threat by the government to legislate unilaterally, the original
agreement was modified by the curtailment of the tax holiday and by the
introduction of an imaginative additional profits tax formula. 7 The
effect of these changes would give the PNG government 61% of the profits
earned in the first half of 1974.8
The successful outcome of the Bougainville renegotiation was a great
achievement for the team from the Technical Assistance Group of the
Commonwealth Secretariat which had sustained the inexperienced government
of PNG during the tough bargaining sessions with a powerful
multinational. However, the "investors' backlash," to which reference
has been made, may be seen in part as a response to such phenomena. The
Bougainville agreement was not an old concession lost in the mists of the
colonial past; it had been negotiated only seven years before the foreign
investor was compelled to accept radical modifications of the original
deal under the pressure of political change. A good example of
investors' reaction to such pressures is contained in the report on
Mineral Development in the Eighties produced in 1976 for the
British-North American Committee under the guidance of Ian MacGregor,
then Chairman of AMAX, the major U.S. mining house. This report detailed
the alleged sins of developing countries regarding nationalisation of
existing investments and attempts to assert "total domestic control" of
new projects. The reinvigoration of the investment climate therefore
depended, it was argued, on a recognition by the developing countries of
a "mutuality of interest" with the foreign sources of sorely needed
capital, know-how and management; only a return to the basic principle of
sanctity of contract could give adequate protection to a viable
investment system.9 This approach inevitably demands that the
governments of host countries, in order to ensure that they "behave,"
submit to the internationalisation of investment contracts for example,
by accepting compulsory arbitration procedures and by becoming subject to
the threat of credit sanctions in the event of alleged breach of contract.
The prospect of renewed pressure on the negotiation position of
developing countries vis-a-vis foreign participators in minerals
development contracts should be seen in the light of the historical
evolution of the present legal environment. For the external guarantees
which investors now seek may be seen as a substitute for the legal
security once offered by the framework of colonial rule, by which
concessions were protected by governments which otherwise reflected an
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investor's ideal of passivity.1 0 In this context, Zambia, the home of
one of the world's largest copper mining operations, provides a good
example of the "old economic order" founded upon concessions traceable to
the very beginning of colonial rule.
The major mines of the Zambian copperbelt were developed by private
foreign enterprise over thirty years prior to independence in 1964. This
development took place in almost perfect laissez-faire conditions: the
colonial government neither played any significant role in the creation
of the industry nor placed any restraint on the activities of the
operators. The mineral rights themselves were enjoyed neither by the
Crown nor by the local chiefs or tribes. The British South Africa
Company, incorporated by Royal Charter in London in 1889, had acquired
mineral concessions which purported to cover virtually the entire country
in the course of "opening up" the territory in the eighteen-nineties.
The Company, in turn, made grants of prospecting and mining rights, often
in perpetuity, to the enterprises which actually carried out the
operational development of the copperbelt. The colonial state was thus
excluded from any contractual relationship between the owner of the
mineral rights and the assignee prospecting and operating companies. In
the 1930's, recommendations by mining law experts for the establishment
of some modest measure of legislative control over operations were vetoed
either by the Colonial Office or effectively by the mining companies.
The arguments of fifty years ago are still heard today. A proposal that
the local government should have a statutory power to compel commencement
or continuance of mining operations and, in certain circumstances, to
confiscate unworked locations, was dropped as likely to frighten away
investment capital. One of the mine operating companies, Rhodesian
Selection Trust Ltd., successfully resisted a proposal to establish some
measure of governmental control over mining grants as likely to create
"so grave a feeling of uncertainty as to diminish if not completely
destroy the zeal and enterprise" with which the mineral resources were
being prospected and developed.11 Here, indeed, was an environment
which perfectly acknowledged the principle of sanctity of contract on
which by Mr. MacGregor and his colleagues still rely. There could be no
question of using the threat of expropriation even as a last resort.
Indeed, the old economic order was a complete inversion of the new order
which asserts the sovereignty of the host country over its own natural
resources.
On Independence in 1964, therefore, the new Zambian government
inherited no tradition of government involvement in the mining
industry.12 It was only after a fierce struggle that the British South
Africa Company surrendered its mineral rights so that these were vested
in the new state.13 The rights of the assignee operating companies,
however, were unaffected; the government had acquired a royalty income
but little else changed. Yet copper was the Zambian economy, providing
in 1965 71% of government revenue and 93% of exports.1 4 Given the
dominance of copper, it was hardly surprising that President Kaunda saw
the road to economic independence as involving the establishment of a
measure of equity participation in and legislative control over the
mining industry. What is significant for present purposes, however, is
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that the terms of the government "take-over" of a 51% interest in the
mine operating companies. These terms were the product of complex and
protracted negotiations which yielded for the vendor companies of the
Roan Selection Trust and Anglo-American groups extremely strong legal
safeguards in their new role as minority shareholders in the restructured
companies, Roan Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and Nchanga Consolidated
Mines (NCM). Thus the bonds and loan stock by the issue of which payment
for the majority interest was effected were unconditionally guaranteed by
the Republic and therefore not dependent upon future profits; elaborate
contractual arrangements and special provisions in the articles of
association of RCM and NCCM left management, financial control and
marketing in the hands of the minority shareholders. The latter were
also guaranteed access, in the event of any alleged breach of the
agreements by the Zambians, to the arbitration procedure provided for
under the World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of other States.15
Thus, although the original invitation from President Kaunda to
negotiate the terms of the take-over could not be refused by the mining
companies -- "a very bitter pill" as it was later described by the then
chairman of RST, Sir Ronald Prain -- the investors operated in a not
unfavourable negotiating climate.16 The "invitation" had placed the
onus on the companies to draft their own proposals for the take-over as a
basis for discussion, a distinct tactical advantage. Moreover, the
government was to be dependent on future co-operation with the minority
shareholders. There was a general anxiety to avoid the Congo (Zaire)
situation of 1966 when the Belgian investor, Union Miniere, had responded
to nationalisation decrees by stripping the mines of plant and even of
typewriters.
President Kaunda's announcement on 31 August, 1973, of the immediate
redemption of the bonds and loan stock and of the cancellation of the
management and marketing contracts might appear a classic example of
reneging on existing agreements and of "changing the rules of the game"
in the manner so often complained of by investors. However, President
Kaunda found that he was unable unilaterally to denounce the contracts
without invoking the legal sanctions attendant upon breach of the 1969
agreements; further detailed negotiations with Anglo-American and Amax
(as successor to RST) were therefore required before the agreed
termination of the management, marketing and other service contracts in
November, 1974 (Anglo) and February, 1975 (Amax). Compensation totalling
K55 million was paid. Sales and marketing were now placed in the hands
of the Metal Marketing Corporation (MEMACO), a 100% state-owned
company.17 NCC1 and RCM became self-managing companies. Their
existence as separate entities, however, reflected the corporate
structures developed in the pre-independence era. So, in May, 1981,
President Kaunda announced, as a process of rationalisation, the merger
of the two companies to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd
(ZCCM). Again the consent of the minority shareholders was required;
agreement on the merger was announced in December, 1981, and implemented
in March, 1982.18
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Zambia thus presents a case-study of the evolution since Independence
of relationships between host government and foreign investor from the
starting point of negligible government involvement in the mining
industry, the latter situation being a legacy of the pattern of
development during the colonial period. This evolutionary process has
taken place in a crisis-ridden environment -- the settler rebellion in
Zimbabwe with its particular impact on fuel supplies and on the
transportation of copper exports, a major disaster at the Mufilira mine,
fluctuating and often depressed copper prices. Inevitably, too, there
have been problems of management and administration. The cumbersome
parastatal structures, through which the state's holdings in the mines
have been channelled, have proved a fertile field for incompetence and
inefficiency. However, through all these difficulties, the consensual
legal framework governing the relationship between host government and
external investor has been preserved, however precariously at times. The
corporate successors of the operating companies who first developed the
mines of the copperbelt over fifty years ago still have a major stake in
the new company, ZCCN, in which the private and corporate foreign stake
initially amounted to nearly 40% of the equity.19
The Zambian experience has continued relevance for the rest of
Central and Southern Africa. For well-known political and historical
reasons, the independence of Zimbabwe was delayed until 1980, and the
independence of Namibia is yet to be achieved. Both these countries have
important mining sectors in foreign ownership and must work out new host
country/investor relationships. The predicament of Zimbabwe, where a
socialist government is now in power, is a particularly delicate one.
The country's mining industry is largely in the hands of multi-national
mining houses such as Anglo-American, Rio-Tinto-Zinc, Lonrhro and Union
Carbide.20 The scope for major state participation in existing mining
operations is limited by the government's own perception of investment
priorities, although 1982 saw two significant moves in this direction.
In October, the government announced plans to acquire a 40 stake in the
Wankie Colliery, thus replacing Anglo-American as the largest shareholder
in the country's only coal producer; in November, proposals were
announced to convert a government loan of ZS 2.7 million to assist the
Empress Nickel Mine into an equity stake in Rio Tinto Zimbabwe.21
The Zimbabwe Government's major initiative has been directed towards
establishing control over the marketing of the country's minerals. The
Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe Act, 1982, establishes a
Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe to act 'as the sole marketing
and selling agent' for all minerals produced in Zimbabwe. The Act
provides that it will be an offense to sell minerals, either inside or
outside the country, except to the Corporation or with the authority of
the Corporation or in accordance with a contract negotiated by the
Corporation. The Corporation will have the option to purchase any
mineral offered for sale on terms agreed with the seller, and, in the
case of all export contract, the Corporation will normally receive all
proceeds of sale on behalf of the sellers. The Corporation will be
empowered to limit the size of stockpiles of minerals which may be kept
by producers and to order the termination of existing export
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contracts.22 Taken in all, the proposed legislation adds up to a major
exercise of state power drastically curtailing the contractual freedom of
the producers. Clearly, the Act has been drafted with the property
guarantees contained in the Independence Constitution in mind; in the
exercise of its powers, the Corporation will be obliged to take into
account the interests of any producer for whom the Corporation may be
acting and the common interest of all producers of minerals.23
In Zambia a state mineral marketing monopoly was not introduced until
after the state had acquired a majority shareholding in and managerial
control of the producer companies. In Zimbabwe the legislation precedes
any significant state participation. The government, through the
Corporation, thus achieves a measure of control without a large financial
commitment at the production stage. Government will be able to regulate
the export market and eliminate the possibility of transfer pricing. (In
responding to attacks on the proposed legislation, Mr. Mugabe had accused
the multi-nationals of "milking" the country by exporting to overseas
associate companies at give away prices.24 However, the government's
intervention at the marketing stage will not be without commercial risk
in view of the fluctuating levels of mineral prices on world markets.
The Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines' reaction to the proposed legislation was
predictably hostile: the Chamber argued that the Act would discourage, if
not eliminate, future investment in mining and would adversely affect
customers' willingness to buy Zimbabwe minerals as "in our experience
major consumers are reluctant to work with Government bodies"; there was
also a fear of "creeping expropriation", as the Act would give the
government "powers to nationalise the mining industry by taking over its
entire commercial function and its current assets." The Chamber's
arguments recall those of the Zambian Mining companies when faced with
the prospect of modest legislative measures in the nineteen-thirties. 25
Zambia and Zimbabwe are both examples of countries with
long-established mining industries where the host country's problem has
related primarily to the establishment of an adequate degree of ownership
and control over existing operations. A number of options are available,
in addition, in the areas of fiscal regime and of exchange control, so as
to ensure the adequacy of the host's "take" and a respectable level of
re-investment. Even countries with established industries, however, are
anxious to encourage prospecting and exploration, where heavy expenditure
may be incurred with no guarantee of reward. In countries with no
significant existing production, the incentive required is all the
greater. Here, the essential starting point is a legislative regime
which provides a secure and defined framework for negotiation, even
though a major project such as Bougainville, discussed earlier will
require legislative effect to be given to a special agreement. 26 A
well drafted mining law of general application will give clear notice to
the potential investor of the host country's concerns and expectations in
such key areas as state participation, exploration expenditure and the
employment and training of local citizens.
A good example of such modern mining legislation is the Mining Act,
1979, of Tanzania, a country where there has been little existing
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development and where lack of local capital resources points to the need
to attract suitable overseas investment. The Act indicates clearly the
government's priorities in the granting of mining licences. Provision is
thus made for the inclusion in a prospecting licence of the right to
acquire on behalf of the state "on stipulated terms, or on terms to be
agreed, an interest in any mining venture which may be carried on in
relation to...the prospecting area" (section 32). The licence must also
include particulars of the licensee's proposals for the employment and
training of citizens of Tanzania (section 31) and (in the case of a
mining licence) a report of "the goods and services required...which can
be obtained within the United Republic and the applicant's proposal with
respect to the procurement of those goods and services" (section 37).
The legislation thus provides a check-list of matters which must be dealt
with, to the satisfaction of the host government, during the course of
the licence negotiations, as well as an assured environment for the
investor in that, if he carries out the agreed programme of prospecting
and exploration satisfactorily, he will be guaranteed an opportunity to
develop, on an agreed basis of participation, any deposits proved.
This is not the place for a detailed examination of the appropriate
fiscal regime, but clearly this is a vital concern to the host government
and to the investor, particularly where the host country's equity stake
is relatively small. A useful precedent is provided by the additional
profits tax formula worked out in the Bougainville re-negotiation of
1974. This is designed to ensure that the investment is not crippled by
an onerous fiscal burden when profit levels are low, but that the host
government will receive automatically an increased share of receipts when
the investor's earnings reach a "kick-in" rate of return on capital
stock.27 Clearly, a flexible fiscal regime of this kind, if introduced
at the outset of a project, helps to avoid pressure for re-negotiation if
the investor's rate of return subsequently appears to reach (for the host
country) unacceptably high levels. It would also be desirable to include
an "old-fashioned" ad valorem royalty provision so that the host country
receives some income from production (the depletion of its wasting asset)
even when profitability is low or non-existent.
The Bougainville experience suggests another lesson of vital
importance to host governments in negotiating resource agreements which
may have momentous consequences for the nation's future - the need for
the highest level of legal and other technical expertise to be available
at the negotiating table. The availability of such expertise will enable
the proposals of powerful multi-national corporations to be subject to
proper scrutiny and will enhance the prospects of a deal which will be
seen to be fair to all parties. Such a deal runs less risk of subsequent
repudiation by a government which otherwise may see expropriation or some
other unilateral act of sovereignty as the only way out of an inequitable
bargain. The risk of such a rupture is obviously greater where the
contract in question is a legacy of colonial rule, as was even true of
the original Bougainville Agreement of 1967. However, the achievement of
equality in bargaining strength remains a problem in a world in which the
proliferated small and weak nation states have jurisdiction over
potentially valuable resources -- a classic example being the small
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island states of the Pacific with claims over huge off-shore exclusive
economic zones. Here the problem of unequal bargaining strength makes
outside assistance imperative. In this regard, valuable work has been
done in recent years by the Technical Assistance Group (TAG) of the
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, which has fielded a "Robin
Hood" team of economists and lawyers to assist the small countries of the
Commonwealth in negotiating resource agreements.28 The "nuts and
bolts" issue of the availability of negotiating skills in any
host/investor bargain should be seen in the context of the wider question
which infoimed the Brandt Report's analysis of the current crisis in
world mineral development: "Measures are needed to speed up exploration
and exploitation of deposits in developing countries, while assuring a
full share of the benefits of mining, processing and exportation to the
host country governments.''29 There seems to be a large measure of
agreement on the need to perfect international arrangements for a
financing facility to relieve the host and the investor of the heavy and
uncertain burden of exploration expenditure. This availability of
"neutral" funding would arrest the decline in exploration activity and
would enable host and investor to negotiate an exploitation contract, as
Brandt put it, "on the basis of assured and equally shared
knowledge."'30 There is the capability for such funding through the UN
agencies, the Lom6 arrangements and through regional organisations.
Progress in this direction may also be seen as complementing schemes for
the stabilisation of mineral export prices, fluctuations in which are the
downfall of so many budgetary plans in developing countries.
If order can be brought into world mineral development, perhaps
future projects may avoid the sad fate of the Selibi-Pikwe copper/nickel
project in Botswana, the bright early hopes of which have been so vividly
conveyed in Sir Ronald Prain's recently published autobiography.31
Despite a political environment stable enough to satisfy the most
suspicious investor and the most careful negotiation of development
contracts after an extended period of exploration, a combination of
technical difficulties and depressed metal prices appears to have ensured
that, even operating at full capacity, the mine will be unable to service
the loan charges and to achieve profitability.
The successful exploitation of the mineral resources of Third World
countries is an undertaking which requires wholehearted co-operation
between host and investor. It is perhaps not too optimistic to hope
that, from the evidence presented in this paper, some ground rules for
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